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ASPECTS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A HABITABLE
ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTAL DUE
PROCESS
RONALD E. KLIPSCHt
INTRODUCTION
Pollution is a complicated function of population, urbanization,
industrialization and technology. The costs of pollution are often far
removed from the benefits, and the environmental tradeoffs are very often
difficult to calculate for purposes of establishing sound social policies.'
That the problems of pollution are and will be severe, however, cannot
be doubted.2
The important issue of today is to determine the best institutional
approach to upgrading the quality of the environment. 3 While techni-
cians can define the consequences of adopting alternative limits on en-
vironmental degradation,4 they cannot tell us how high our standards
for environmental quality should be.' That is to say, they cannot answer
t Member, Wisconsin Bar.
1. For a description of the problems see 3. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND
PRICES (1968) [hereinafter cited as DALES]; A. KNEEsE, S. ROLFE & J. HARNED, MAN-
AGING THE ENVIRONMIENT: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION FOR POLLUTION CON-
TROL (1971) [hereinafter cited as KNEESE] ; A. REITZE, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as REITZE]; ENviRONMENTAL PROTECTION (L. Jaffe & L.
Tribe eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROTECTION].
2. D. H. MEADows, D. I- MEADows, J. RANDERS, W. BEHRENS III, THE LIMITS TO
GROWTH 33 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LIMITs].
3. Tarlock, Book Review, 47 IND. L.J. 406, 411 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Book
Review].
4. In the future, power may flow from lawyers to the technical professions because
technicians have the capacity to take a more integrated view of the problems. Standards
are increasingly unsuccessful not primarily because of lax enforcement, but because of
insufficient scientific and engineering understanding of the issues and alternatives.
See id.
5. For example, any water pollution program must resolve three basic issues:
(1) the level of water quality desired, (2) the amount of pollutant to be removed to
reach this quality level, and (3) the allocation of the burden of cleaning up the water.
Ackerman & Sawyer, The Uncertain Search for Environmental Policy: Scientific Fact-
finding and Rational Decisionmaking Along the Delaware River, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 419
(1972). Only the second issue involves purely scientific considerations. More narrowly,
where particular power plants are challenged on the basis of environmental considera-
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the question, "How much pollution shall we have?" This answer must
come through our governmental institutions.
The solutions to the environmental problem are not within the
province of a single part of our governmental structure. The interests
which must be weighed include the whole range of human activities-
the demand for energy and material goods, the desire for better health,
the special need of the poor for greater wealth, the limitations of tech-
nology, etc. Moreover, any decision must also maintain the balance of the
various ecosystems.'
There can be no doubt of the crucial importance of the political and
tions, at least three basic "legal" issues must be resolved: (1) Did the utility and
authorizing agency sufficiently consider the environmental impact of the plant? (2)
What is the appropriate governmental unit or combination of units which should exer-
cise final authority over the utility's decision as to the location and design of the plant?
(3) Do the utility's power projections justify the need for the plant at the time it is
proposed? Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Considerations and Energy Demands: A
Comwnt on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, hIc. I. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Tarlock]. Only the third issue involves purely "factual"
considerations. The existence of the regulatory structure for the power plant problem
allows the issues to be more narrowly defined than is possible in the first example which
involved a general water pollution program. There would seem to be at least two broad
"how much" questions: (1) How much degradation should we have, and (2) how much
can occur to specific components of an ecosystem before that system is threatened? Few,
if any, environmentalists argue that the air must be completely "pure." See J. SAX, DE-
FENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN AcTIoN 162 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as SAX]. The answer to (1) is a question of the highest policy, but depends in
large part on the factual answer to (2). One protective approach toward the environ-
ment would be the establishment of ecological base lines beyond which the environment
would be protected from more stress than the natural capacity of an ecosystem could
accommodate. Caldwell, Environment: A Challenge to Modern Society, in SELECTED
LEGAL AND EcoNoMIc ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 205 (C. Meyers & A.
Tarlock eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as ASPECTS]. Studies of several river basins in-
dicate that the regional management approach greatly increases the effectiveness and
efficiency of water quality improvement programs. See KNEESE, supra note 1, at 19.
Streams might instead be "specialized," so that one river is given to the polluters and
another is preserved for fishermen and swimmers. DALES, supra note 1, at 73. It is
not clear that such specialization would be permitted under some constitutional claims.
In addition, pollution costs might be internalized by establishing property rights in com-
mon resources based upon established pollution standards. See, e.g., ASPECTS, supra, at
16-19. Such a scheme of cost internalization would allow the market mechanism to
efficiently allocate the use of common property resources, thus "solving" the pollution
problem in an economic sense. This would not necessarily assure an acceptable pollution
level from an environmental perspective. This "solution" reflects the difference in
viewpoints: the economist's pollution concern is whether human use of a resource is af-
fected; the ecologist's concern is whether an ecosystem is affected, regardless of known
restraints on human uses. See Heller, Coming to Terms With Growth and the Environ-
inent, in ENERGY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONIMENT 3, 10-11 (S. Scharr ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as Heller]. It seems apparent that bare constitutional analysis
cannot approach the sophistication necessary to "solve" air and water pollution problems.
6. Allocation of pollution rights would seem to be much like FCC allocation of the
electromagnetic spectrum. No one power plant may destroy the air, but many sources
"interfere" with the pollution absorption capability. The problem is one of "zoning"
on a massive scale. See note 152 infra & text accompanying.
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administrative processes in solving the problems of the environment.
Indeed, since environmental controversies yield many possible solutions,
legislation is the superior method of resolution because no criteria exist
for choosing alternatives except accommodation of interests.' Legisla-
tion institutionalizes the principle of accommodation of interests.'
Adjudication, on the other hand, presupposes that a standard of
decision exists to apply to a conflict, and the results of adjudication are
most easily enforceable where a standard is neutral or accepted as legit-
imate. The aim is to declare and defend rights, not to accommodate
interests.' Yet, most environmental controversies are not susceptible to
being reduced to a consistent right-duty relationship between citizens
and public agencies.'" In order for a claim to be classified as a right, there
must be a consensus that in a given range of conflicts the claim should be
given priority. No such consensus exists with respect to environmental
claims," and as one author has written:
[C]oherent, stable -and morally supportable -government
is possible only on the basis of consent, and . . . the secret of
consent is the sense of common venture fostered by institutions
that reflect and represent us and that we can call to account."
It may be true that the legislative and executive branches possess
superior institutional capacities that make them generally better equipped
to make and implement basic environmental policy decisions, such as
responsiveness to the electorate's value preferences, broad, information
7. Howard, Adjudication Considered as a Process of Conflict Resolution: A Vari-
ation on Separation of Powers, 18 J. Pun. LAw 339, 347 (1969). The author dt-Fes ad-judication as a method of peaceful conflict resolution in which parties present evidence
and arguments to a neutral third party for decision according to established principles.
Id. at 339.
8. Id. at 348.
9. Id.
10. Book Review, supra note 3, at 412.
11. Id. at 414. The response of the federal government to the current energy short-
age illustrates problems of trying to factor environmental considerations into existing
departmental and agency programs in the absence of any consensus about fundamental
questions. Tarlock, vcpra note 5, at 662. The Arrow "impossibility theorem" inquires
into the suitability of democratic decisionmaking procedures. The problem is to sum-
marize individual preference orderings to produce a unique social ordering of priorities.
The theorem holds that under certain reasonable postulates the democratic decision
process (social welfare function) results in intransitivities (irrationality). Transitivity
may be preserved only if there is a fair cultural uniformity as to values and standard of
judgment. Where such uniformity is lacking, majority rule will often result in in-
transitivities, with the result that the social decision is imposed. Absent a consensus,
even the political process cannot insure unique social preference orderings. See Black,
On Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. 12 J. LAw & EcoN. 227 (1969).
12. A. BicKE, THE LEAST DIANGEROUS BRANCa 20 (1962) (in the context of a dis-
cussion of the justification for judicial review).
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gathering capacities, specialized expertise, and the capacity for sustained
follow-through." However, the election of enlightened executives and
legislators is a long run solution, and cannot bring back the dead lake or
the species of life made extinct.1  It cannot provide an easy means of re-
treat from environmentally unsound decisions made by administrative
agencies. Lawsuits cannot supply needed environmental information, but
they can sharpen the issues and question the factual basis for various
assertions about the environment. 5 The limitations of the judicial pro-
cess, the complexity of the problems, and the suitability of other institu-
tions for expressing values and devising solutions are worthy of the most
serious consideration in determining the Existence and scope of any con-
stitutional right to a habitable environment. But such considerations do
not necessarily preclude the right's existence nor, at this point, delimit
its scope.
This article suggests that the courts and the Constitution can pro-
vide some answers to the right to a habitable environment. After making
several necessary observations about the nature of the environmental
problem, this article will examine various constitutional doctrines relat-
ing to this right, and offer suggestions for a doctrinal base on which to
rest a limited constitutional right to a habitable environment. Case law
in this area will also be examined.
NATURE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM
Environmental degradation imposes costs on society in terms of
health, psychic and economic losses, and some of these costs may have
constitutional significance. Health costs are one example. While no area
of the world sufferr a sufficiently high mean annual air pollution level to
cause continuous acute health problems,'16 air pollution disasters involving
massive illness and death haye occurred several times in the last forty
years.' Yet health is such a complex matter that it is difficult to sort out
the various factors causing illness or death," and environmental health
13. Ruckelshaus, The Citizen and the Environmental Regulatory Process, 47 IND.
L.J. 636, 643 (1972).
14. Hanks & Hanks, The Right to a Habitable Environment, in THE RIGHTS OF
AiiERICANS 152 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Hanks & Hanks].
15. Book Review, supra note 3, at 411.
16. Lave & Seskin, Air Pollution and Human Health, in PROTECTION, supra note 1,
at 65, 66 [hereinafter cited as Lave & Seskin].
17. Such disasters have occurred in Belgium in 1930; Donora, Pennsylvania, in
1948; London, England, in 1952 and 1962; and in New York City in 1953, 1962, 1963,
1966. REiTZE, supra note 1, ch. 3, at 1.
18. Lave & Seskin, supra note 16, at 67.
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hazards develop so slowly that the harm may be far removed from the
cause.
19
Property damage is another cost which is almost too obvious to cite.2"
Moreover, those who suffer most from pollution are those whom society
has already rejected as social outcasts-the aged, the poor and the minori-
ties who are trapped in the inner city.2 The urban poor tend to live, work
and play in the inner city, living closer to streets with high concentra-
tions of traffic and exhaust fumes. They breathe highly polluted air
twenty-four hours per day compared to the wealthier classes who spend
more time where the air is cleaner.22
There is no indication that thtse costs will decrease. Indeed, the
contrary is more likely. The American labor force for the next twenty
years is already born and intends to work. Absent a deliberate policy of
unemployment, this fact is also of enormous significance. For over 100
years productivity has been rising at 2 to 3 per cent per year, and the pro-
fit motive promotes daily private decisions favoring higher productivity. 3
Moreover, increased productivity is essential since we aren't really so af-
fluent when one half of all households earn less than $8,500 per year.24
Given increases in both productivity and the size of the labor force, pro-
duction should increase at about 4 per cent per year for the foreseeable
future.25 This means more ;lectric power, smoke, cans and steel, and
consequently, more air and water pollution.
19. RE IT'zE, supra note 1, intro., at 2-3.
20. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, in REITZE, supra note 16, ch. 3, at 3-4.
21. Id., ch. 3, at 9.
22. KNEESE, supra note 1, at 14. Because the city tends to be warmer than the
countryside, the resulting air circulation patterns intensify the entrapment of air pollu-
tion. This is called the "heat island effect." REITZE, supra note 1, ch. 3, at 1.
23. Dale, The Economics of Pollution, in PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 17 [herein-
after cited as Dale].
24. Id. at 17. Given the present extent of poverty, crime and other social ills,
growth may be a necessary condition for social advance-for improving the quality of
the total environment. Heller, supra note 5, at 10, 11.
25. Dale, supra note 23, at 19. At a 4% growth rate total production would double
every eighteen years. United States GNP grew at 3.4% per year during the period
1961-1968. LImiTs, supra note 2, at 49. It should also be noted that government spend-
ing also induces increased environmental degradation. Sewage plants require more steel
and electric power; government employees require paper to do their work, and they are
paid and consume; increases in welfare spending increase the consumption of the poor.
The shift from private to public spending would thus have little impact on the waste
total, except to the extent that spending is for services rather than goods. Dale, supra
note 23, at 20.
It should also be apparent that pollution is always economically beneficial to some
people to some extent, if only that it reduces the price of products. Id. at 7. See also,
Tarlock, supra note 5. For example, conversion from the gasoline piston engine would
put an enormous drain on many of the nation's energies. Also, the growing energy crisis
207
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The second outstanding characteristic of the environmental problem
is the complex balance among the various "ecosystems." Plants, animals
and microorganisms living in the same area are biologically intercon-
nected. These interdependent biological and physical components make
up an ecosystem. 6  The more complex ecosystems arb more stable."7
Perhaps the most subtle and dangerous threat to our existence is the
potential destruction, by man's activities, of the ecological systems upon
which the human species depends.2"
The systems nature of the environment means that solutions to pol-
lution problems often increase or create other pollution problems. For
example, carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions are reduced by
high compression engines operating at high temperatures, but carbon
dioxide and nitrogen oxide production are thereby increased. 9 Pitts-
burgh cleaned up its air by dumping its residuals in the Ohio River."
These complexities ard compounded by the fact that even the waste
materials interact. Sometimes wastes are harmful in themselves, some-
times harmful effects cancel out and somifetimes harmless wastes combine
to be harmful. 1
A final observation about the nature of the environmental problem
involves the associated structural economics. 2 Our economic system
favoring free markets holds consumer and producer sovereignty as
fundamental value premises. Our policy is to allow the personal wants
of individuals in society "to guide the use of resources in production, dis-
tribution, and exchange."2 4 Under ideal conditions a competitive market
structure would result in a Pareto Optimal allocation of resources."
Under such conditions, the most efficient solution to the resourdes alloca-
tion problem would be to limit the government to decisions about income
distribution, rules of property and enfordement of competition.36 How-
poses the problem of minimizing pollution costs without sacrificing economic benefits.
See KNEESE, supra note 1, at 73-81.
26. ASPECTS, supra note 5, at 200, quoting P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, POPULATION,
RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT: ISSUES IN HuMAN ECOLOGY 157-59 (1970).
27. ASPECTS, supra note 5, at 201.
28. Id.
29. REITZE, supra note 1, ch. 3, at 58.
30. Book Review, supra note 3, at 413 n.33. There could be a net gain in pollution
abatement through a social decision to shift to goods requiring less energy production
however. See Heller, supra note 5, at 6-8.
31. DALES, supra note 1, at 6. See also KNEESE, supra note 1, at 212-16 which de-
scribes the reactions brought about by excess carbon dioxide emissions.
32. See ASPECTS, supra note 5, at 1-19, 205-10 & articles cited therein.
33. Davis & Kamien, Externalities and the Quality of Air and Water, in ASPECTS,
supra note 5, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Davis & Kamien].
34. KNEESE, vupra note 1, at 6.
35. Davis & Kamien, supra note 33, at 5.
36. KNEESE, supra note 1, at 6.
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ever, the market system fails to control the use of "public goods," such
as the pollution assimilation capacities of air and water." Common pro-
perty is degraded because pollution appears costless to producers and in-
dividuals since these scarce assets are not individually owned and man-
aged." There is no way to express desires for clean air through our
market mechanism for allocating resources. Such values must be ex-
pressed through our social institutions responsible for public policy."9
Unrestricted use of common property leads to social, political and
economic frictions because individuals have no legal rights with respect
to such property. Wh= the government fails to restrict the use of com-
mon property, the policy appears neutral, but, in fact, always favors the
polluter: swimmers cannot harm polluters, but polluters can harm
swimmers. When rights to common property are undefined, those who
use it in ways causing degradation inevitably triumph over those who
don't." Government cannot express a policy of neutrality through in-
action.'
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Thk advocates of a constitutional right to a habitable environment
face a heavy burden of demonstration, not the least of which is that of
definition. The "right" has been variously advanced as the "right to a
habitable environment," '42 the "right of frleedom from ecocide"'43 and the
"right to be free of unreasonable environmental degradation."44 . Such
37. Id. at 48.
38. Id. at 8. Strictly, the failure is because property rights in such assets are not
defined. Such rights are difficult to define because of difficulties in excluding others
from the use of the resource. See Goetz, Public v. Private Goods, in AsPEcTs, supra
note 5, at 10-16. Public ownership would be acceptable in the economic model if prop-
erty rights could be defined.
39. KNEESE, supra note 1, at 48.
40. DALES, supra note 1, at 67. See also Krier, Environmental Litigation and the
Burden of Proof, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 105 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds.
1970).
41. This says nothing about whether government should be, or is required to be,
neutral. Government inaction may reflect no intent, but merely ignorance or inattention
to the facts. If so, inaction expresses no policy at all.
42. Hanks & Hanks, supra note 14, at 146.
43. Pettigrew, A Constitutional Right of Freedom from Ecocide, 2 ENv. L. 1 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Pettigrew]. Ecocide is defined as the substantial destruction of an
integral part of a particular ecosystem or the unreasonable degradation of the environ-
ment in general.
44. Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. Rxv. 458
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Note]. The author proposes such a standard to allow a
court to balance environmental needs against demands for material progress. Part of
the difficulty is the attempt at definition in the abstract, for which the author should
not be condemned, but which may explain the general absence of attempts to find policies
supporting the definitions given. Thus, the "unreasonableness" standard would seem to
have at least two aspects, procedural and substantive: (1) procedural insofar as the
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definitions are overbroad and hopel ssly devoid of policy guidance,"5
since the term "environment" includes both (1) the complex of physical
and biological factors acting on an organism or ecosystem, and (2) the
aggregatLe of political, economic, social and cultural conditions that in-
fluence individual and group behavior."
The better (and easier) approach is to ignore this definitional phase
altogether and ask instead whether any interests are protected from par-
ticular types of environmental degradation.4" The question should be not
whether there is a right to a habitabf~e environment, but whether health,
life, property, nearly extinct animal species or aesthetic interests, etc. are
protected from environment-altering activity.48 In this way, one asks,
for example, whether the Constitution guards against specific environ-
mental effects on human lIeYngs rather than a more generalized harm to
entire ecosystems. 9 One also asks whether the Constitution prohibits
harm to ecosystems apart from perceived effects on human beings.
Rights relating to the environment may be derived through two con-
ceptually distinct methods. One approach is to attempt to find environ-
mental rights within specific constitutional guarantees, each guarantee
viewed independently of all others. This approach would be institution-
ally advantageous to the Supreme Court because it follows a traditional
analysis and because the right would bear a traditional name. For ex-
ample, particular cases would hold that on the facts there was a viola-
tion of due process, rather than holding that environmental rights were in-
fringed. However, this method seems so narrow as to foreclose any broad
rights for the preservation of ecosystems as such. The second approach,
more consistent with the rights sought by ecologists, is to consider the
Constitution as a whole, including the preamble,"0 and to derive environ-
outcome is affected by the current state of the art; (2) substantive where the state of
the art is irrelevant, e.g., under the most severe threats to health. The definitions are
not, for the most part, policy oriented so as to provide any analytical approach to such
cases.
45. A problem which the authors Hanks recognize. Hanks & Hanks, supra note
14, at 146.
46. Id.
47. The substantive arguments of many authors do precisely this, although they do
not explain their abandonment of the definitional approach.
48. This is not to suggest the traditional case-by-case approach. Here, the ques-
tion is more general-e.g., assuming that air pollution threatens human health, is there
any right to be free of such a threat. If such a right exists, one might then formulate
policies for deciding when the threat is "unreasonable."
49. This is the question whether the Constitution implements the economist's or the
ecologist's concern about pollution. See note 5 supra & text accompanying. See Petti-
grew, szupra note 43; Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment: Progress Along a
Constitutional Avenue, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMFNT 134 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds.
1970) [hereinafter cited as Roberts].
50. The preamble is often used for purely rhetorical comments. See, e.g., McGau-
210
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mental rights which would be conceptually independent of existing guar-
antees, though supported in part by the policies of such guarantees.5 '
This would allow the development of an "environmental due process"
analysis not confined to conventional analysis." This article will explore
these constitutional theories in greater detail, and suggest a middle path,
but first there should be an examination of the limitations to the existence
or scope of rights which might be found, the most important of which is
the requirement of state action. 3
State Action
It is well-settled that the fifth amendment is a limitation on the
powers of the federal government only,"' and that the fourteenth is
directed at actions of the states, rather than those of individuals.5 There-
fore, it is ordinarily necessary to determine whether the requisite govern-
mental action is present in order to assert a constitutional right unless
the right to be free of air pollution does not require such action.
Most air pollution tonnage is generated by private individuals and
corporations who are unregulated by the government, although some of
their activities may be licensed. The mere issuance of a license, however,
is not sufficient government involvement for there to be "state action"
under the fourteenth amendment,5 nor, presumably, under the fifth.
tha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 246 n.17 (1971) ; Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320
F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1970). The preamble is not a source of substantive power
conferred on any department of the government of the United States. Jacobson v. Mas-
sachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). The extent to which it may limit the exercise of sub-
stantive powers is not clear.
51. This is the approach most used by environmentalists, but they usually look only
to certain rights provisions and ignore the governmental powers provisions, labeling the
result a ninth amendment right. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 49, at 162-63; Note, supra
note 44. Others base their arguments entirely upon the ninth amendment. See Petti-
grew, supra note 43, at 5. The ninth amendment is considered in more detail below.
52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), seems to permit such an ap-
proach.
53. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
54. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). This is not totally accurate since some
rights such as the right of travel affect individuals directly, as does the ninth amend-
ment. See notes 104 & 105 infra & text accompanying.
55. See notes 14-17 supra & text accompanying.
56. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). The Court held that the
mere issuance of a liquor license to a private club is not such state involvement with the
club's activities as to make the club's racially discriminatory practices forbidden by the
equal protection clause. The Court reasoned that to hold state action exists whenever
private discriminators receive any benefits or services at all from the state would be to
emasculate the state-private conduct distinction. Id. at 173. The licensees were regu-
lated in detail as to their facilities and were required to maintain extensive financial and
membership records, but none of these regulations were perceived as fostering discrim-
ination. Dissenting Justices Douglas and Marshall agreed that mere licensing would be
insufficient state involvement for purposes of the equal protection clause, but argued that
there was sufficient state involvement since only a limited number of licenses could be
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On the other hand, the issuance of certificates of public convenience and
necessity, which often amount to a grant of monopoly, may be sufficient
governmental involvement. This theory would make tle activities of
most power companies government action.
Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak7 involved government regu-
lation under such a certificate. The Commission regulated the service
and equipment of a private street railway company in the District of
Columbia. THe company received and amplified radio programs through
loudspeakers in its passenger vehicles, and the Commission, after full
hearings on the matter, concluded that the radio service was not incon-
sistent with the public conVenience, comfort and safety. Some passengers
complained that continuation of the service violated their rights under
the first and fifth amendments. The Supreme Court held that there was
a sufficiently close relationship between the government and the radio
service to require a consideration of the constitutional claims on the merits,
although it specifically declined to rely on the mere fact that the company
operated under the authority of Congress and thereby enjoyed a monopoly
of the street railway and bus transportation in the District." Rather, the
Court relied on the fact that the Commission had investigated the par-
ticular question and had refused to interfere with the radio service. This
analytical approach is consistent with the Court's general practice of
narrowing constitutional questions. The case does not reject the theory
that thd authorization of a monopoly, through the issuance of certificates
of public convience and necessity, would be enough to constitute the
licensee's actions, state action. In this case, the Commission's action
amounted to direct authorization of the challenged activitiy, and there-
fork the holding indicates only a sufficiency condition rather than a neces-
sary condition.
issued and the majority had been issued to private clubs, raising the probability that
Blacks and Whites would not have equal access to liquor in the county. Id. at 180-83.
Interestingly, the majority held a particular license condition requiring all clubs to fol-
low their bylaws to be state discrimination, since the club's bylaws discriminated. Id. at
178-79. This analytical segregation of the various license conditions suggests a search
for "causation" of the discrimination and, more importantly, when linked to the other
holding discussed above, indicates that there is to be no doctrine of "pendent state action"
even within the context of a single regulatory scheme of a single licensing agency. In
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the
Chief Justice, writing for himself and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, held that a broad-
cast licensee's refusal to accept a paid editorial advertisement is not "government action"
for first amendment purposes, on the ground that the licensee policy challenged was
within the discretion allowed by Congress in its journalistic role and the FCC had not
fostered the policy, but merely allowed the exercise of such discretion. Id. at 118-19.
See also P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 14-20 (1968).
57. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
58. Id. at 462.
212
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However, in Moose Lodoge No. 107 v. Irvs5" the Court held that
certain liquor licensing regulations did not sufficiently involve the state
in fostering the racially discriminatory practices of a licensfed private
club. Although the licensing and regulatory schemes in Moose Lodge
were not as comprehensive as those associated with the regulation of a
power company, this case suggests that the existence of a more compre-
hensive fegulatory pattern and even the granting of a business monopoly
would zot be sufficient government involvement in the emission of air
pollutants. This is so because overconsumption of the air's pollution as-
similative capacity results from individual perception of the air as a free
resource, and not because of factors inherent in the monopoly grant.
While the monopoly, because of its grant, may be in a better economic
position to unilaterally employ antipollution measures, its failure to re-
duce emissions cannot transform its polluting activity into governmental
action; it would have the constitutional duty to reduce emissions only if
those emissions were government action in the first instance.
Power company rate structure and plant siting are regulated by
government agencies, and both types of regulation arguably affect emis-
sion levels directly to an extent sufficient to make such emissions govern-
mental action within the principles of Pollak and Moose Lodge."0 How-
ever, such factors as discount rates to high volume consumers, advertising
expenses for the promotion of power consumption and pric increases for
antipollution technology affect the environment by increasing consump-
tion. In addition, plant siting affects the overall concentration of pollutants
in the air and water near the plant. An agency's attempts to maintain
lower prices to power consumers does not prevent these regulatory acti-
vities from being considered sufficient goVrment action for purposes
of the due process clauses. Moreover, just because an agency has not been
particularly concerned with environmental matters does not prevent its
actions from affecting the environment in a manner that would constitute
direct governmental involvement.5 1
59. 407 U.S. 163 (1972) ; see note 56 supra.
60. In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973), the FCC had rejected the claims of DNC and concluded the challenged licensee
policy was not inconsistent with the public interest. Chief Justice Burger distinguished
Pollak on the grounds that the FCC regulatory licensing scheme is not as pervasive as
that in Pollak and that journalistic discretion is preserved under the Communication Act,
subject only to overall performance in the public interest. Id. at 120. Thus, licensee
decisions are, to a larger extent than in Pollak, free of government supervision.
61. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In that
case, state action was found when the owner of a restaurant which was leased from a
state-owned parking garage discriminated on the basis of race. However, the Court in
Moose Lodge characterized the state-lessee relationship as symbiotic because income from
the lease was necessary to support the parking building. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.
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It is sometimes urged that economically powerful private corpora-
tions should be subject to constitutional limitations as the state itself is,
chiefly because such enterprises have sufficient power to invade constitu-
tional rights and because the government relies upon the corporate system
to perform economic functions for which the people hold the government
ultimately responsible.62 This argument, however, begs the question of
whether private action can amount to governmental action. On occa-
sion, private organizations have been deemed clothed with sufficient public
responsibility, with or without statutory mandate, to be subject to con-
stitutional limitations. 3
There are other ways in which the government is involved with
private pollution activities. As discussed above, an "anything goes" policy
always favors the private environmental degrader over the environmental
preserver, thereby permitting the private polluter to view the consumption
of common resources as costless." This "policy" can be characterized as
a kind of environmental "zoning" which is a governmental function.6
407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972). Moreover, the agency had the power to require service on
a nondiscriminatory basis. NEPA now mandates the consideration of environmental
values, but even without this statute one could surely not accept a claim that no govern-
ment action is involved-so that constitutional rights are not at stake-merely because no
statute directly authorizes consideration of constitutional rights. To accept such a claim,
where environmental rights are at stake, would be to allow such rights to be abridged
merely because no one considered them.
62. See Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity--Protection of Per-
sonal Rights from lI'vasion through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1952).
63. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968) (shopping center open to public) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (com-
pany owned town) ; Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (labor
unions) ; Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960) (private bus
company). For an article treating the evolution and direction of the state action concept,
see Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAs L. Rxv. 347 (1963). See also text
accompanying notes 32-41 mpra.
64. For this to be deemed government involvement, there would have to be some
government responsibility toward common resources. There appears to be a government
responsibility under the public trust doctrine, especially as articulated in Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). See notes 72-81 infra & text accompanying.
Neither government ignorance of the theory that market competition necessarily leads to
over consumption of common resources by producers who are acting as profit maximizers,
nor ignorance that this behavior has in fact been a major cause of the pollution problem,
has any bearing on the issue of government action. However, this again is not to say
that the "anything goes" policy is unconstitutional, even if there are environmental
rights. The discussion here is only of government action and not of the merits.
65. Where the Court invalidated on equal protection grounds an amendment to the
California constitution which provided that the state could not deny the right of a per-
son to convey residential real estate in his absolute discretion, Mr. Justice Douglas ad-
dressed the state action question as follows:
Zoning is a state and municipal function .... When the State leaves that
function to private agencies or institutions which are licensees and which prac-
tice racial discrimination and zone our cities into white and black belts . . . it
suffers a governmental function to be performed under private auspices in a
way the State itself may not act.
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Moreover, government has contributed significantly to the rapid growth
of private automobile use through extensive highway construction. This
result stems from a "systems" view which regards roads and cars as com-
ponents of the nation's transportation system. Racial minorities who have
been confined by government policies to central urban areas have special
claims that government action has subjected them to particularly severe
threats to health and life from air pollution, even if there is insufficient
government involvement in the pollution itself.
If, in the absence of comprehensive regulation, government in-
volvement in private pollution activities is deemed insufficient, there are
serious state action problems where the degradation in ambient air quality
is due to multiple source emissions, most, but not all, of which are private.
Is there government action with respect to the overall degradation where
the government action source, acting alone, would not consume the at-
mosphere's pollution assimilative capacity? Such a source at least pro-
motes the overall problem. If so, may there be a remedy-either
damagess or an injunction-against only the governmentally involved
source? Aside from the difficulties in allocating damages to the govern-
ment source, such a limitation of defendants would make the environ-
mental right itself of little use. Could there be a doctrine of "pendent
government action," so that private polluters could be joined as defen-
dants with the government action source? It seems not,"7 but then why
bother to hold that there is insufficient governmental action involved in
the private pollution activities?
If the environmental right is not incorporated into the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments--i.e. if the right is found
under the ninth amendment or is deemed to stand on its own, then argu-
ably, the right could serve to limit private activities as well as those of the
government. Such a right would not be unique. 8 However, Mr. Justice
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 384 (1967) (concurring opinion). In its narrowest
sense, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), which held that judicial enforcement of
private racially restrictive covenants violates the equal protection clause, might be viewed
as analogous to zoning cases.
66. There might be a right of action for damages against either the regulating
agency itself or its officials who make the regulatory decisions. Cf. Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), holding
that the violation of fourth amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures
by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for
damages against the agent.
67. There would seem to be problems of due process toward the defendants under
such an approach, which smacks of guilt by association. Besides, the rejection of a
"pendency" theory even as to independent actions of a single government agency seems
to preclude the bringing in of private defendants whose actions are, by hypothesis, in-
dependent of government action. See note 56 supra.
68. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) ; United States v. Guest, 383
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Harlan has stated his opposition to such a concept:
As a general proposition it seems to me very dubious that
the Constitution was intended to create certain rights of private
individuals as against other private individuals. The Constitu-
tional Convention was called to establish a nation, not to reform
the common law. Even the Bill of Rights, designed to protect
personal liberties, was directed at rights against governmental
authority, not other individuals. 9
Justice Harlan is surely correct as to his general proposition, for the
Constitution as a whole is concerned with the allocation of public powers
to various institutions. In our society many private interactions were
intended to occur free from a pervading governmental interest which
would exist if the Constitution regulated such activities. The existence
of the state action-private action distinction indicates this much. Indeed
the policies developed in deciding particular state action questions should
be relevant to the issue of whether any environmental right extends to
purely private conduct."0 A polluter's claim to privacy for his polluting
activities would seem to be of minimal significance; but to answer whether
this is sufficient to overcome Mr. Justice Harlan's objections would be the
merest speculation, and the point is not further pursued.
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The first constitutional doctrine affecting the environment which I
intend to discuss is the public trust doctrine.7' This doctrine contains
U.S. 745 (1966). In these cases, statutes prohibiting conspiracies were upheld, at least
in part, on the theory that the right to travel runs against private individuals, but con-
spiracies rather than individual actions were involved.
69. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 771 (1966).
70. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
71. I do not intend to treat the fifth amendment "taking" doctrine in depth, al-
though it should be mentioned. Where government action results in the "taking" of an
"air easement" over private property, the owner's loss is compensable under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) ; United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). The "taking" may be accomplished by a nuisance which
substantially deprives the owner of the use of his land. Thornburg v. Port of Portland,
233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) (noise nuisance). If polluting activities, regu-
lated or not, are deemed government actions, this theory seems rather easily extendable
to holding the polluters liable for the property damage they inflict, at least to the value
of a pollution easement. If the polluting activities causing property damage are deemed
private actions and if the landowner cannot get an injunction, then some would argue
that this remedy limitation is equivalent to allowing an unconstitutional private power
of eminent domain. Unfortunately, this is also equivalent to maintaining that, as a con-
stitutional principle, "property" may never be imperfectly defined in terms of exclusiv-
ity, i.e., that whenever an interest would be deemed "property" for constitutional pur-
poses, the interest necessarily includes the absolute right to exclude all others from any
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three general principles: (1) certain interests, such as the air and the
sea, are so important to the citizenry that it would be unwise to make
them the subject of private ownership; (2) these interests partake so
much of the bounty of nature, rather than of individual enterprise, that
they should be freely available to the entire citizenry without regard to
economic status; and (3) a principal purpose of government is to pro-
mote the interests of the general public rather than to distribute public
goods to restricted private benefit." The doctrine has very little to say
about the distribution of the benefits of trust resources, nor does it
prohibit government disposition or use of trust property as long as
public rights are protected." The American trust doctrine has never de-
termined that common property resources must be held in reserve from
all private development or that they must be maintained in their traditional
purity."4 The public trust theory involves a close judicial scrutiny of
public resource disposition, but provides no standards for a court to
decide that any but extrem uses of natural resources violate public
rights. 3 Public trust law is "a technique by which courts may mend
sort of intrusion. This argument ignores the still serious concern with the state action
limitation, it ignores Mr. Justice Harlan's point that the Constitution is not designed to
be a common law of private relations, and further ignores the fact that under traditional
nuisance law some damage short of substantiality is permitted without even a damage
remedy. "Property" is not a physical attribute, but a matter of definition. Limiting the
owner's remedy to damages is equivalent to a definition of what the owner's "property"
is. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rides, and Inalienability: Ote
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
72. SAX, supra note 5, at 165. Professor Tarlock argues that these three principles
cannot be derived from the public trust doctrine for it cannot determine what level of
environmental quality should be maintained. Book Review, supra note 3, at 412. It ap-
pears that the Sax principles cannot determine what level of quality should be maintained,
whatever may be the case with the doctrine itself. Rather, the three principles seem
aimed at determining which resources should be subject to the trust and not, in them-
selves, to answer "how much" questions. No case was discovered which applied the doc-
trine to air.
73. Book Review, supra note 3, at 412-13.
74. SAx, supra note 5, at 167. Courts have reviewed transfers for developmental
purposes on a standard which requires that the grant be for a use which is consistent
with the protection of the public rights for which the trust was imposed. ASPECTs, supra
note 5, at 220. The doctrine functions more to delay development rather than to provide
standards to constrain it. Id. at 240.
75. Book Review, supra note 3, at 413. The leading case is Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). The 1869 Illinois legislature gave the railroad fee title
to much of the submerged bed of Lake Michigan. The 1873 legislature repealed the
1869 statute. The state won a quiet title action to the submerged land over the rail-
road's claims that it held a vested property right. The Supreme Court held that the
lands were subject to a public trust and that the state could not grant the lands so as to
substantially impair the public interest in lands and waters remaining. The state could
not abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, so as to
leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties. This case would seem
to indicate that the government has the necessary ultimate responsibility for trust re-
sources, so that there could be government action in the government's silence about air
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perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative process
. ... a medium for democratization."76
The Constitution has been construed as imposing a trust on public
property,7 usually for the purpose of upholding restraints imposed by
Congress on the use of -such property. The trust is apparently applicable
to any public asset capable of disposition as property belonging to the
United States. In Ashwander v. TVA, 8 shareholders of a private cor-
poration challenged, on ninth and tenth amendment grounds, the power
of Congress to authorize the TVA to contractually dispose of surplus
electric energy to their company. The Court held that Congress' power
over public property under Article IV, Section 3, is not limited to terri-
tory, but extends to all property, both real and personal, that rightfully
belongs to the United States. Electric energy generated at the TVA darn
was deemed susceptible of disposition as property belonging to the United
States. The plaintiffs' claims were rejected on the ground that Congress'
power under Article IV, Section 3, is plenary, but as to the method of
disposing of common property, the Court said:
[It] must be an appropriate means of disposition according to
the nature of the property, it must be one adopted in the public
interest as distinguished from private or personal ends, and we
may assume that it must be consistent with the foundation prin-
pollution. See note 116 infra & text accompanying. If the air is subject to a public
trust, this case suggests that government cannot, beyond some level, allow its continued
degradation. The constitutional doctrine developed under article IV, section 3 does not
seem to go so far in restricting the alienation of trust property, though cases of per-
ceived abandonment of trust responsibilities of the magnitude in Illinois Central have
seldom been litigated under that clause.
76. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Elfective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 509 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Public Trust].
77. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3; several cases illustrate this point. Light v. United
States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911), held that the United States was entitled to injunctive relief
against a farmer who grazed his cattle on a forest reservation without acquiring a per-
mit from the Secretary of Agriculture as required by statute. The Court reasoned that
(1) all public lands of the United States are held in trust for the people, (2) it is not for
the courts to say how the trust shall be administered, and (3) Congress may preserve
the lands or disestablish the preserve and devote the property to some other national and
public purpose. Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104 (1918), upheld, in a suit by a judgment
creditor seeking to levy execution on the debtor's homestead, prohibitions in the Home-
stead Act of 1862 against levies for prior debts, reasoning that Congress has plenary
power to dispose of the public lands upon such terms and conditions as the public in-
terests require. United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940),
held the United States entitled to an injunction to restrain the city from disposing of
electric power to private utilities in violation of restraints imposed in a grant of access
to Yosemite National Park. The Court said, "Congress [is] in effect trustee of public
lands for all the people . . ." and reasoned that the congressional power under article IV,
section 3 is without limitations and that Congress may limit the disposition of the public
domain in a manner consistent with its view of public policy. Id. at 28.
78. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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ciples of our dual system of government and must not be con-
trived to govern the concerns reserved to the states.7"
One perhaps seldom thinks of air as "property" of the United States
in the sense of any proprietary interest. In economic terms, it is common
property and seems to fit ideally within Professor Sax's three principles.
However, even if air, or the atmosphere's pollution assimilative capacity,
Were brought within this constitutional doctrine, the environmentalists
should still be troubled. The Court has indicated that Congress has
plenary power over the disposition of the trust, at least so long as the dis-
position is for a public purpose. The use of the air as a dump to promote
industrial growth and national wealth would seem to satisfy the public
purpose limitation. Congress may not have affirmatively expressed such
a policy, though a belief in growth might be said to be an American
characteristic, but environmentalists would not want the claimed right
destroyed by a statute. The preservation of the air for human health
could not be said to be the sole reason for imposing the trust,8 although
this use is significant. At best, health would have to be balanced against
other uses of the trust under the doctrine. This would be a rather minimal
doctrinal advance over ignoring the uses of the atmosphere, although it
would perhaps be of greater significance with respect to the degradation
of other ecosystems. Certainly there would be constitutional protection
not now afforded such systems, but this would hardly elevate human
health to the preeminent constitutional concern which the environment-
alists seek. They seek to elevate the environmental rights to the status of
the Bill of Rights; a status which the public trust doctrine is not designed
to convey.
NINTH AMENDMENT
The ninth amendment 2 is many things to many people, but what it
is to the Supreme Court is not entirely clear.8 3 It is variously a source of
79. Id. at 338.
80. See note 77 spra.
81. The trust theory is to protect the majority from the will of the minority-the
opposite of the concern in Bill of Rights problems. Thus, public trust problems should
not be considered constitutional issues for resolution by the courts where there has been
a clear legislative determination of the uses to be made of trust resources. Public Trust,
supra note 76, at 559-65.
82. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people"' U.S. CoNsr. amend. IX.
83. It may be clear to Mr. Justice Douglas. Dissenting in Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217, 231 (1971), which held that the closing of all public swimming pools in
Jackson, Mississippi, did not violate the equal protection clause, he said:
There is, of course, not a word in the Constitution . . . concerning the
right of the people to education or to work or to recreation by swimming or
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natural justice rights ;"4 a rule of construction for securing unenumerated
rights" (but not a source of rights 9) ; a grant of standing to argue public
rights ;" a source of public rights ;"s and solely a protector of individual,
personal rights.8 9
Arguments for the creation of new substantive rights through ninth
amendment adjudication tend to fall into two categories: (1) claims that
the amendment is itself a source of rights," and (2) claims that the
amendment is only a rule of construction allowing an examination of the
Constitution as a whole in a search for new rights.9 The distinction may
be a mere technicality, since the language of the amendment certainly does
not suggest policies independent of the Constitution as a whole, but the
former view may theoretically allow a more searching inquiry into ma-
terials beyond the text of the Constitution. In effect, both arguments
authorize a "substantive due process" approach.92
Both the language and the history of the ninth amendment appear
to support an argument that at least some of the rights found must limit
the states, as well as the federal government. Indeed, "fundamental"
rights, as concepts of natural law, could hardly be so labeled if the states
otherwise. Those rights, like the right to pure air and pure water, may well be
rights "retained by the people" under the Ninth Amendment.
Id. at 233-34.
84. See Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E=MC2: Environment
Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNntL L. Rxv. 674, 691
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Decent Environment].
85. Pettigrew, supra note 43, at 11.
86. Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained by
the People, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 121, 134 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kutner] ; Comment,
The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Anmedinuent, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 814 (1966).
87. Mr. Justice Harlan suggested this possibility, perhaps somewhat tongue-in-
cheek, in his dissent in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 n.18 (1968).
88. See Ritz, The Original Purpose and Present Utility of the Ninth Amendment,
25 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ritz].
89. B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 58 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as NINTH AMENDMENT]. Patterson offers the most comprehensive treatment of
the history of the ninth amendment, but extensive discourse on the history may also be
found in Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309
(1936) ; Kutner, supra note 86; Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by
the People"?, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 787 (1962) ; Ritz, supra note 88.
90. Patterson contends that the amendment preserves natural justice rights, such as
the right of privacy, the right to acquire property, and the right to the fruits of one's la-
bor, because it expresses the general 18th century American political philosophy of the
social compact. NINTH AMENDMENT, supra note 89, at 55, 69. Others view the amend-
ment as preserving, on its own force, those "fundamental" rights originating in the his-
tory and traditions of our people. See, e.g., Bertelsman, The Ninth Amendmeint and Due
Process of Law-Toward a Viable Theory of Unenumerated Rights, 37 U. CIN. L. REv.
777 (1968) ; Note, Ninth Amendment Vindication of Unenmnerated Fundanental Rights,
42 TEMP. L.Q. 46 (1968).
91. See, e.g., Pettigrew, supra note 43, at 43.
92. See NINTH AMENDMENT, supra note 89, at 36-41.
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were not restrained." By its terms the amendment applies to the entire
Constitution, rather than just the first eight amendments, and the Con-
stitution prohibits certain actions by the states.94 Moreover, ninth amend-
ment rights are unenumerated, so that there is no reason to suppose that
only the federal government is limited. 5
In any case, one might ask whether the ninth amendment does any-
thing which the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not do, aside from
possibly legitimating "substantive due process." It has been suggested
that the fifth and fourteenth amendments apply to "persons" in their
individual capacities, whereas the ninth preserves rights of the "people"
as the people,9 i.e., that it provides public rights either in lieu of or in
addition to private rights. This assertion may be correct if Madison's
proposed first amendment, understood to be a bill of rights, survives in
the ninth amendment, for its prime purpose was to safeguard rights of
the people qua the people.9 If a right to "happiness and safety"9" is such
a right, and if "safety" includes "health," and "happiness" includes "aes-
thetically pleasing surroundings," then arguably there is a public right
to be free of environmental degradation which threatens human life or
unique natural phenomena. This seems equivalent to stating that our air
resources are subject to a public trust, at least insofar as the public's
health is protected. However, finding this right in the ninth amendment
(or any other) specifically limits the disposition of the trust, rather than
merely providing a factor to be considered in determining whether the
trust is being used for a public purpose.
Even if the ninth amendment only legitimates "substantive due pro-
cess," as the language and history of the amendment seem to suggest,
this could be of significant value to the Supreme Court's institutional
93. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
94. The ninth amendment was the tenth clause of Madison's proposed fourth amend-
ment. Madison's fourth amendment was to have been inserted in article I, section 9,
which seems to apply only to Congress. However, Madison's proposed first amendment
was to have applied to the entire Constitution and was called a "bill of rights." Madison
indicated that at least one purpose in drafting the tenth clause of his fourth amendment
was to counter the objection that a "bill of rights" would disparage unenumerated rights.
NINTH AmENDfENT, stepra note 89, at 115-16. The proposed first amendment failed to
pass, but this should not alter the conclusion as to the intended scope of the ninth amend-
ment. Id. at 110-16.
95. Ritz, szpra note 88, at 12. But see NINTH AMENDMENT, stpra note 89.
96. Ritz, supra note 88, at 3.
97. Id. at 14. The three rights are: (1) the right to acquire and use property;
(2) the right to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; and (3) the right to reform or
change the government. See note 159 il!ra.
98. Ritz suggests that the right to happiness and safety arises whenever the govern-
ment becomes impotent or for other reasons fails to carry out its obligation in this re-
gard. Ritz, supra note 88, at 15. He does not discuss environmental rights.
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position. No longer would the Court be open to a charge of bestowing
power "on The Court by the Court""9 merely because it resorts to such
analysis, although the responsibility to articulate principled decisions
would remain.' 0 Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for himself, justice
Brennan and Chief Justice Warren, considered the ninth amendment not
to be an independent source of rights. They held, in Griswold v. Con-
necticut,'" that its language and history imply the existence of unenumer-
ated fundamental rights which are contained in the traditions and collec-
tive conscience of our people. In that case, Justice Harlan asserted that
judicial restraint requires respect for the teachings of history, recognition
of the basic values that underlie our society, and an appreciation for the
doctrines of federalism and separation of powers in establishing and pre-
serving American freedoms."0 2 These "standards" add nothing of signi-
ficance beyond the due process clauses. Whether these standards are ade-
quate to support principled decision, or sufficient to find environmental
rights, is discussed below.
DUE PROCESS
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
For over 75 years the due process clauses"0" have been employed by
the courts as a constitutional reservoir of values to support a broad
spectrum of limitations upon conduct-regulating and enforcement policies
of the state and national governments.' The Supreme Court has not
clearly delineated the constitutional function of the due process clause,0 3
but differences between "substantive" and "procedural" due process have
been noted.'
To find substantive due process rights, it is said that one must ex-
amine the history, the traditions and collective conscience of our people,
the role of federalism and the separation of powers, as well as the emana-
99. This was the charge of Mr. Justice Black in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 507, 520 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
100. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 57-58 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as BICKEL].
101. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (concurring opinion).
102. Id. at 499.
103. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048,
1049 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ratner].
104. Id.
105. As Professor Bickel notes, procedural due process is generally concerned with
structure and method, rather than ends, though some procedural rules foreclose effective
pursuit of substantive policy as a practical matter. BICKEL, supra note 100, at 233. The
Court is able to regulate the area of procedural due process because of its expertise as a
court. See Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
106. See, e.g., Pettigrew, supra note 43, at 18.
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tions of specific guarantees.' However, the Court has not always dis-
tinguished substantive and procedural due process in setting forth such
standards.' The Court has maintained, in effect, that the due process
clause empowers the judiciary to impose natural law limitations upon
the conduct-regulating and enforcement authority of government.' The
terms "sense of justice," "fundamental principles," "traditions and con-
science of the people," "concept of ordered liberty," and "basic civil
rights," are modern designations for the natural rights of man; they are
labels, not standards for decision."'
Where there is a question of substantive due process, the Court
should evaluate not the comparative utility of competing policies, but the
minimal utility of the policy adopted."' Due process implements our
philosophy that government may restrict human activity only for a socially
useful purpose;".2 greater restrictions on human activity are not socially
useful when lesser restrictions will do the job."' Thus, our substantive
due process inquiry might be two-fold: (1) whether there are any en-
vironmental rights, and (2) what restrictions may be placed upon the
rights found. However, we must first deal with the question whether the
due process clause on its face affords any protection against environ-
mentally degrading activities. When a specific constitutional guarantee
exists, there is no need for a substantive due process inquiry.
Assuming that there is the requisit. government action involved in
air pollution activities, the due process clauses may provide limitations on
those activities if "life" includes "health" and "deprive" includes
107. Whether double jeopardy in violation of the fifth amendment is also a viola-
tion of the fourteenth depended on whether it is a "principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.). To determine whether comment on
a defendant's failure to testify violates the fourteenth amendment, one looked to the
whole proceedings to determine whether they offend "those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples." Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Also, "[d]ue
process bars Congress from enactments that shock the sense of fair play .... " Galvan
v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (Frankfurter, 3.).
108. Ratner, .supra note 103, at 1053.
109. Id. at 1057.
110. Id. at 1077.
111. Id. at 1070.
112. [A] governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unneces-
sarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (Harlan, J.).
113. Thus, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court found a
right of marital privacy and held that the statute forbidding the use of contraceptives,
rather than merely regulating their manufacture or sale, was overbroad in its impact on
the right.
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"threaten."11 Indeed, if property can be "taken" by a nuisance, there
would seem to be little reason to hold that health cannot be, if in fact a
person's health is injured by pollution. Assuming that the due process
amendments protect only individual rights, as opposed to public rights,
the question is merely one of proof. In Virginians for Didles v. Volpe," 5
the plaintiffs claimed that noise from jet aircraft injured the health of
persons on the ground in violation of the fifth amendment.'16 The court
held that no fifth amendment rights had been violated since there was no
case of specific personal injury causally related to the noise and since
the evidence failed to establish a generalized injury to health from the
noise. Implicit in the rejection of the fifth amendment claims on evidenti-
ary grounds is an acceptance of the assertion that the fifth amendment
protects health if actual injury can be demonstrated. The court's con-
sideration of generalized injury may indicate that the establishment of
such injury would make out a prima facie case for a plaintiff. On the other
hand, the generalized injury may have been considered because the suit
was brought as a class action. Of course, one might wish to allow the
individual plaintiff to show only the existence of a generalized injury to
health, but this would be the equivalent of establishing a public right.
Moreover, if the plaintiff were to prevail on such a showing, though not
actually injured himself, this would in effect create an entirely new con-
stitutional right beyond the traditional concept of due process now under
consideration.11
114. Some of the famous economic liberties cases were as significant for their con-
structions of the word "liberty" as for their holdings about "due process." See, e.g.,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (liberty of contract; failure of due process
because the regulation was an unreasonable and arbitrary interference with the liberty,
bearing no rational relationship to the needs of the public health) ; Allgeyer v. Louisiana,
165 U.S. 578 (1897) ("liberty" includes liberty of contract; failure of "due process" be-
cause the statute regulated contracts made and to be performed outside the state). No
cases were found which construed "life."
115. 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972).
116. Plaintiffs also claimed an invasion of privacy in violation of the ninth amend-
ment. This claim was rejected on evidentiary grounds, as was the fifth amendment claim.
Id. at 579.
117. The creation of a new environmental due process right, not limited by tradi-
tional due process considerations, is discussed below. See note 128 infra & text accom-
panying. The present discussion is limited to the scope of due process rights under the
language of the due process amendments. It is not clear that the plaintiff whose health
is not actually injured would have "standing" to complain in the federal courts. At the
least, article III may require that the challenged action caused the plaintiff "injury in
fact." See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970). Standing to litigate the public interest requires that the plaintiff be among the in-
jured. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Threatened harm to the plaintiff
would probably be enough; this would be the typical case for injunctive relief. Threatened
health hazards to the general public might also be enough under the broader public right
to be considered. But under purely traditional concepts it is difficult to understand why
ASPECTS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Assuming that governmental action actually injured the plaintiff's
health, and the injury was sufficient to constitute a "deprivation of life"
within the due process clause,"' the question would remain whether the
deprivation was without due process of law. In economic liberties cases,
the question is only whether there is a rational relationship between the
activity and a permissible societal objective,"' or the absence of demon-
strable irrationality. 2 P Debatable issues of business, economic and social
affairs are left to legislative action, and the Court will not attempt to make
comparative judgments about competing social utilities.' Yet, precisely
this type of comparison is required when the question is whether the
government may promote economic growth and power consumption at
the sacrifice of the health of a few individuals.
Such a comparison might be made today because growth has been
encouraged without even considering health effects. Agency and legisla-
tive decisions have not balanced the needs for growth against health ef-
fects, but have reflected no policy at all with respect to health. This failure
to even consider a significant constitutional value is a paradigm example
of arbitrariness, and, as such, is violative of due process. 2 However,
even when the government has considered health effects in choosing a
growth policy, there are due process considerations short of comparing
utilities under a "least restrictive alternative" approach.' Under this
approach, the Court might require the use of the latest antipollution or
antinoise technology as a due process minimum for the policy of promot-
ing growth. 2 ' Such a criterion avoids a court inquiry into such matters
as where power plants should be sited and what fuel should be used for the
a plaintiff who is himself not even threatened with harm should be able to invoke any
aid of the judiciary. Cf. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
118. One might demand that the injury be such as to have actually reduced the
plaintiff's life expectancy to some degree. In such a case there would be a deprivation
of "life" in a sense as factually meaningful as complete extermination. This would
make the "taking" of life analogous to the taking of property by a severe and continu-
ing nuisance; whether the remedy should be compensation, completing the analogy to
eminent domain, is considered below. Where there is only suffering, without permanent
injury, there seems little reason to elevate the nuisance to a constitutional "deprivation."
119. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
120. See A. BicxE., Po LIIcs AND THE WARREN COURT 178 (1965).
121. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
122. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMIxIsTRATIvE AcTIox 182 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as JUDIcIAL CONTROL]. See also Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and
$idicial Review, 65 COLJ M. L. REv. 55 (1965). Choices made without considering health
effects are arbitrary with respect to such effects, rather than arbitrary or irrational in
any absolute sense.
123. See notes 112-13 supra & text accompanying.
124. Such a rule would not necessarily be economically efficient because it might be
cheaper to force, or allow, some industries to develop technology while allowing others
to pollute. The terse answer is that "due process" doesn't always choose the cheapest
way of doing things.
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generation of power.'25 Even where health effects have been measured and
pollution standards set, due process should require either the complete use
of the best antipollution technologies or a pollution level geared to the
scientifically determined health-pollution standards, whichever resulted
in the lower pollution level. The health standards, therefore, would be a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the satisfaction of due process.
Environmental Due Process
The narrow due process concept developed above would not satisfy
most environmentalists because even the compulsory utilization of the
best technologies would not completely halt the degradation of the environ-
ment. If, on a statistical basis, air polluting activities damage the health
of every nth resident of an urban area, 2' the "best technology" rule would
not necessarily prevent this, although the size of n would be affected.
Environmentalists might urge that n must be reduced to zero on
the premise, implicit in the due process amendments, that life is sacro-
sanct. 2 ' Such a rule would also avoid "comparative utility" problems and
create no ad hoc balancing problems in particular cases. But it is difficult
to understand why a constitutional policy favoring life and health interests
goes so far as to rank these interests absolutely ahead of every other con-
sideration under all possible circumstances, especially since such a result
would effectively read "due process" out of the due process amendments.
There are practical considerations suggesting that the due process right
should not be carried so far. First, any decision to close down the pol-
lution activities would have an immediate serious impact on the economic
well-being of everyone. Day-to-day living would be affected by a single
court decision to an extent unimaginable in other contexts. Second, this
impact would result from the rankest speculation due to the limitations
of the adversary process as a means of ascertaining factual truth about the
harm to the affected individual. Surely one would want to know what
125. It is tempting to suggest that one might require any plant to be sited so as to
minimize pollution effects. Such a rule might require that all United States power
plants be located in northeastern Maine. Any other requirement as to siting would in-
volve a balance of various considerations which the court should avoid, though the
court might still require the government to show that health effects had been considered
in the site selection. The legislature may opt for a permit-market-pricing scheme to con-
trol air pollution. See DALES, supra note 1, at 93-97. This step might allow all ambient
air degradation to be deemed government action, and "least restrictive!' due process
might require prices to be high enough to insure an ambient air quality at least as good
as if all polluters used the best antipollution technology available for their particular
processes.
126. See Hanks & Hanks, supra note 14, at 149.
127. See Roberts, supra note 49, at 144-47. This is not an assertion that the air
must be maintained in a perfectly "pure" state, but an assertion that purity must be de-
fined in a particular way with respect to health.
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caused the harm before deciding to inflict severe consequences on the
other members of society. Finally, even the injured individual benefits
to some extent from the polluting activity, if only by paying lower prices
for some goods."2 8 This should not stop the assertion of individual rights,
but should be a factor to consider before creating absolutes within a social
context.
On the other hand, beyond the confines of traditional due process
reasoning, the proposed best technology rule is deficient in another re-
spect: it is geared not to the ecosystem concept, which recognizes that
all activities within a system affect all components of a system, but to a
very narrow balancing of human health and economic growth. This
analysis does not insure the consideration of environmental values other
than human life at the constitutional level. This is so because the due
process concern is really not the environment as such, but only human life.
What is needed, if the Constitution is to be of utility in protecting
interests other than health from environmental degradation, is a principle
of "environmental due process" which would operate without the analyti-
cal constraints of the due process amendments. This principle, or set of
principles, would insure an institutional response to environmental prob-
lems without involving the courts in substantive comparisons of utilities.
Such a principle may be developed even without new substantive environ-
mental rights, just as procedural protections for "unprotected" speech
have been developed.
Obscenity is not "speech" protected by the first amendment." 9 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has found itself developing a comprehensive
system of "procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a
censorship system."'3 0 This serves to provide some protection for obscen-
ity because of the desire to protect the nonobscene. These procedural
rules are themselves first amendment rights which do not depend on the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.'' Sensitive procedural devices have
been deemed necessary because first amendment freedoms need some
"breathing space" to function outside the courtroom," 2 and restrictions
on the regulation of conduct have been imposed where speech and non-
speech elements combine.' Similarly, health is arguably afforded some
128. See DA&Es, supra note 1, at 7.
129. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
130. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
131. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HAgv. L. REv. 518 (1970).
132. Id. at 519-23.
133. Government regulation is sufficiently justified if: (1) the regulation of the
nonspeech element is within the constitutional power of government; (2) the regulation
furthers an important governmental interest; (3) the government interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction of first amend-
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protection under the due process clause. We know that health is affected
by any activity within the ecosystems, that an "anything goes" policy
favors increased pollution, and that exponential economic growth means
that "harmless" activity may become harmful in a veritable twinkling.
Procedural safeguards with respect to all environmentally degrading ac-
tivity would enable citizens to preserve their breathing rights. Such safe-
guards should exist whether or not the citizen could prove an actual im-
pairment of or threat to health for the same reason obscenity is so pro-
tected. The risk of loss of health is too high if governmental organiza-
tions are not legally coerced into seeking adequate protective measures.
Since environmental interests are underrepresented in the present low
visibility agency decisionmaking process, the new environmental due
process should require a right to effective public participation in agency
decisions."" It may be that environmental policy choices will ultimately
have to be made by the legislature, but agencies are daily deciding matters
with irretrievable environmental impact. Participation rights limited to
voting for legislators cannot affect daily agency decisions.
This aspect of environmental due process may be regarded in part as
an extension of principles adopted by the Supreme Court in other areas.
In Red Lion Broadcastivy Co. v. FCC,3 ' the Supreme Court upheld an
application of the "fairness doctrine" against a challenge by broadcasters
that their first amendment rights were infringed. Justice White noted
that broadcast frequencies are a scarce resource whose use can be regulated
only by the government."3 6 Some see the case as providing a citizens' right
of access to mass media." 7 There is also language in the opinion to sup-
port an argument that the fairness doctrine is constitutionally required
where government has undertaken the allocation of a scarce resource. 38
Environmental conflicts are also problems of resource allocations,"3 9
and where the government is, in effect, allocating scarce pollution assimi-
lation resources, Red Lion could be extended to require the production of
information about such activity. An information rule would be particularly
relevant to the overuse of common resources, since there is no market
pricing mechanism for these resources which would reveal allocation.
mert freedoms is no greater than essential to the furtherance of the government interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
134. See Hanks & Hanks, supra note 14, at 152-57.
135. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
136. Id. at 390.
137. See, e.g., Pemberton, The Right of Access to Mass Media, in THE RIGHTS OF
AmERICANS 276 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971). But see Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Naf I Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
138. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969).
139. See Book Review, supra note 3, at 414.
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There is an unusual aspect to governmental activity which affects
environmental rights. Enforcement of governmental decisions depriving
citizens of liberty or property do not usually occur, and perhaps may not
occur, without resort to the judicial process. 4" Yet, this is precisely what
occurs where environmental values are underrepresented or unrepresented
in decisions having environmental impact. Thus, it is most important
that there be adequate judicial review of such decisions. Agencies should
be required to write "principled" opinions explaining the environmental
impact of a decision, and they could be required to answer citizen requests
for information in writing.""' In some cases, the court may even decide for
itself that the impact would be unreasonable," 2 although this approaches
a level of substantive intervention shunned at the outset of this discussion.
However, the court might decline to decide questions of reasonableness
except where some element of an ecosystem would be severely damaged
or destroyed by government activity. In light of such an impact, the
court could decide if it would be reasonable to allow the activity to con-
tinue as planned, considering costs, the state of technology, as well as the
probable impact on the ecosystem as a whole.
There are, of course, certain problems attendant upon the creation of
public rights, enforceable at the demand of every individual. The proper
functioning of the federal courts and the principle of separation of powers
may be threatened.143 Moreover, judicial review under these circumstances
may tend to weaken the democratic process. However, there are at least
two democratic defenses to the rights discussed above. First, the rights
outlined have as their primary goal the broadening of democratic processes
and the minimizing of substantive court intervention in environmental
matters. Second, democratic decision processes tend to produce circulari-
ties in the ordering of social values unless there is a fair uniformity or
consensus as to those values and the standards for decision.' This may
justify judicial assertion of perceived constitutional values in environ-
mental matters.
140. See JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 122, at 383.
141. See Kalodner, The Right to Participate, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 194,
201 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971).
142. See ASPECTS, supra note 5, at 351 n.34. When a "fact" is the asserted consti-
tutional predicate for the assertion of power, the existence of the fact might be deter-
mined by the court. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (opinion of Justice
Brennan) ; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
143. See Harlan, The Bill of Rights and the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 918 (1964);
cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 116 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
144. See Black, On Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, 12 J. LAw & EcoN. 227 (1969)
Riker, Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An Interpretive Bibliographical Re-
view of Selected Developments During the Last Decade, 55 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 900
(1961).
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Environmental activities which pose no apparent threat to human
health contain no clear principle which would either establish the existence
of substantive environmental rights or which could be reasonably applied
to decide specific cases. A right against unreasonable impairment of
health would seem to be principled, if only because it is supported by the
language of the due process clause. Such a principle, however, provides
no standard for decision in specific cases even if "unreasonableness" takes
into consideration such factors as loss of jobs, effects of the poor, and
forced changes in life styles. Even in the area of health, the due process
clause does not begin to answer the question "how much".'45 The total
lack of standards in this area compels me to conclude that the more limited
right suggested above is a more appropriate judicial undertaking.
The Supreme Court has the responsibility to maintain the distribu-
tion and limitations of public power, primarily through special guardian-
ship of legal procedures, and to preserve an open society whose govern-
ment is to remain both responsive and responsible.' Considering this
special responsibility, the purposes of government outlined in the pre-
amble, the principles underlying the public trust concept, the high valua-
tion of life in the due process amendments and the case law development
of rights to participate in social decisions, one might be surprise4l if the
federal courts do not develop procedural rules geared to remedy the under-
representation of environmental values in decision making forums. 4
145. In Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Hoernor Waldorf Corp., 1 E.R.C.
1640 (D. Mont. 1970), the court's reasoning about rights against air pollution was as
follows: "So it seems to me that each of us is constitutionally protected in our natural
and personal state of life and health." Id. at 1641. One is entitled to doubt the wisdom
of entrusting environmental concerns to such a decision process.
146. P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTicE 56-59 (1968).
147. Courts are acting to improve the decisionmaking process, though not at the
constitutional level. In Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc.,
48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966), an action to condemn a right of way for a gas trans-
mission pipeline, the court held that the defendant's voluntary consecration of the land
to use as a preserve required a lesser showing of arbitrariness by the state in selecting
the route than in the case of an ordinary private landowner. The court placed the burden
of going forward with justification for the route on the plaintiff upon the defendant's
showing of serious damage to the preserve and the existence of an apparently reasonable
alternate route, though the defendant retained the ultimate burden of proving arbitrari-
ness. The federal courts are requiring agencies to develop better records. Scenic Hud-
son Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
941 (1966). Courts are also looking beyond enabling legislation for other statements of
legislative policy. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199
(5th Cir. 1970). Where statutes address environmental concerns, agency discretion is
being confined. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
When dealing with air or water in their ambient or interstate aspects there is a
federal common law, to be derived in part from federal statutes, which is sufficient for
"federal question" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1970). See Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109
(1972). Traditionally, "standing" distinguishes the particular plaintiff from the public
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ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS CASES
United States Constitution
Claims of constitutional rights against various forms of environ-
mental degradation 'have received an uncertain reception in the federal
courts. Where such claims have not been rejected outright on the merits,
plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the requisite government involve-
ment. Claims have sometimes been phrased in such generalized terms that
courts have had difficulty coming to intellectual grips with the problem,
and only one court has truly confronted the lack of substantive decision
standards.
Three environment rights cases have involved air pollution. En-
vironmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf48 was a suit to enjoin
operations of a private pulp and paper mill in Missoula, 'Montana. The
defendant was allegedly emitting noxious sulfur and other toxic com-
pounds into the air, thereby causing irreparable harm to plant, animal
and human life. The emissions could be prevented through the applica-
tion of modern technology. The court 'held that individuals are constitu-
tionally protected in our natural state of life and health, but held, pro-
bably correctly under Moose Lodge, that there was insufficient govern-
ment involvement in the polluting activity.'49 The mayor of Missoula
and the State Planning Board had invited the defendant to the area and
encouraged public acceptance of the plant, but state licensing did not ifi-
dude pollution regulation. The court rejected EDF's argument that the
private pollution damage to a nearby national forest was an unconstitu-
tional taking of public property, holding that the fifth and fourteenth
amendments apply only to the public taking of private property.
In a second case, In Re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip-
vment,"' the plaintiffs sued several private producers of gasoline and
motor vehicles, claiming that the pollution resulting from the operation
of motor vehicles violated their rights to clean air and a safe, healthy en-
vironment as protected by the fifth, ninth, tenth and fourteenth amend-
at large. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The.Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1036 (1968). But the notion that the con-
stitution demands injury to a personal interest is historically unfounded. See Berger,
Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L..
816 (1969). Expanded standing of course increases the participation of environmental
interests in agency decisionmaking.
148. 1 E.R.C. 1640 (D. Mont. 1970). See also Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp.,
5 E.I.C. 1755 (N.D. W. Va. 1973), which rejected, on jurisdictional grounds, fifth, ninth
and fourteenth amendment claims of private parties against a private corporation and
certain state and federal agencies.
149. 1 E.R.C. at 1641-42.
150. 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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ments. The court "held" that the Constitution confers no such rights, but,
with more assurance, refused to hold that the activities of huge private
corporations are government actions. Likewise in Tanner v. Armco Steel
Corp.,'5' where the plaintiffs sought to recover damages from a private
corporation for injuries to person and property from air pollution, the
court held there was no government action and rejected the fifth, ninth
and fourteenth amendment claims on the merits. This court at least gave
some reasons for rejecting the fourteenth amendment claims. First, the
court noted that the history of the amendment does not support environ-
mental claims, and second, it reasoned that the fourteenth amendment
provides no standards for deciding when such rights are infringed or
what remedies are to be fashioned. Finally, the court concluded that con-
stitutional litigation and the judicial process are ill-suited to solving prob-
lems of environmental control because of the delicate balance of competing
social interests involved, because true solutions will require the applica-
tion of specialized expertise, and because the inevitable tradeoffs between
economic and ecological values should not be made through an ad hoc
decision process." 2
All three of the above suits were against "private" defendants, so
that the constitutional claims were clouded by the government action
question. 53 Only the Tanner court seriously analyzed the constitutional
problem, but only the Hoerner Waldorf plaintiffs requested a remedy con-
sistent with the substantive due process analysis developed in this paper.
Apparently, no plaintiffs offered their courts any standards which might
be adopted for either the merits of the claims or a new theory of govern-
ment action. The Hoerner Waldorf plaintiffs had a particularly unique
opportunity to offer the court a narrow basis of decision because there
was no difficulty in linking their defendant to any damage which might
have been proved. The Tanner court adequately disposed of the most
generalized constitutional arguments, but more narrow arguments have
yet to be faced by any court.
Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co." 4 was an action under § 1983
by lower riparian landowners against nineteen industrial corporations
for damages and injunctive relief for alleged water pollution. The plain-
tiffs claimed the defendants' wastes were harmful to fish, wildlife, live-
151. 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
152. Id. at 536-37.
153. See notes 54-70 & text accompanying.
154. 328 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Ala. 1971), affd, 456 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946 (1972). The Fifth Circuit did not discuss the constitutional
claims, expressly holding only that there is no private right of action under the Refuse
Act of 1899.
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stock and human beings, all in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.'55 Alabama had issued permits for the waste discharges, but the
court held this insufficient "state action" for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment, even though the issuing agency had the power to regulate
or prohibit the discharges. The case seems incorrect as to its "state ac-
tion" holding, but the result was probably influenced by the plaintiff's
reliance on riparian rights alone and the court's conclusion that such rights
are not protected by § 1983.'
Three cases involved the construction of buildings or dams. In Ely
v. Velde,"' local residents sought to enjoin the construction of a penal
facility in their county on the ground that the "area is of such historical
importance to all the people of the United States that the construction on
the site selected would unnecessarily and unreasonably degrade the en-
vironment in violation of the ninth and fourteenth amendments."' The
court rejected the consitutional claims,' 59 saying that the state interest in
building on the particular tract must also be considered. However, the
court did not consider why the state had to build on that particular site,
and, in effect, the plantiff's arguments were rejected per se. In United
States V. 247.37 Acres,60 the court rejected claims that the government's
taking of land for flood control use violated plaintiff's ninth amendment
rights to have their property and its surrounding environs preserved in
their natural state, saying that extensions of the ninth amendment must
be left to the Supreme Court. Finally, in Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers,'"' the plaintiffs sued to enjoin work in furtherance of
a plan to construct a dam, contending:
The right to enjoy the beauty of God's creation, and to live in
an environment that preserves the unquantified amenities of
155. The plaintiffs also asserted a cause of action under the Refuse Act of 1899.
The fourteenth amendment claim was alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), but of
course depended on the fourteenth amendment for success. 328 F. Supp. at 1143.
156. The court held, more narrowly, that the statute is intended to protect only
personal liberties, not property rights. There was no discussion of the alleged harm to
human beings. The court held that the fifth amendment limits only the federal govern-
ment. Id.
157. 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971).
158. Plaintiffs also argued that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) failed to consider the impact of the facility on the area as required by NHPA
and NEPA. The district court held that the LEAA need not look beyond its enabling
statute, but the Fourth Circuit held that LEAA must consider the requirements of both
NEPA and NHPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), 16 id. §§ 470-470n. Ely v. Velde, 451
F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
159. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on this point, but noted that the plaintiffs of-
fered very little in the way of argument beyond the bare assertion of rights. Id. at 1139.
160. 3 E.R.C. 1098 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
161. 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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- life, is, part of the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments... and is also one of those unenumerated rights
retained by the people. . . as provided in the Ninth Amend-
ment .... .62
The court responded by quoting Judge Learned Hand:
"Nor is it desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating
opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in the womb
of time, but whose birth is distant.
' 163
State Constitutions
Few cases have been decided under the recent state constitutional
amendments providing protection for the environment. Of the few, two
were resolved in terms of burden of proof and one in terms of the public
trust doctrine.
Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower'6 was an
action based on an amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution provid-
ing protection for the environment, 65 by the State of Pennsylvania to en-
join the erection of a steel tower near the Gettysburg National Military
Cemetery and the Gettysburg National Military Park. The U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior had sanctioned the tower at the proposed site, and
this was an important factor leading the court to conclude there would be
no irreparable harm to historical values as a result of constructing the
t6wer. The court also concluded that there was no irreparable harm to
scenic, esthetic or natural values, considering the redeeming educational
and economic significance of the tower. The injunction was denied be-
cause Pennsylvania had failed to demonstrate irreparable harm to any of
the values expressed in the state constitution. The court failed to explain
why the state has the burden of proof and failed to articulate decision
criteria beyond the sense impressions of the particular judge.66 In ad-
dition, it is not clear why "irreparable harm" is the criterion for an in-
junction where constitutional values are at stake. Perhaps the judge only
meant that there would be no harm if the tower is constructed, using pre-
sent day Gettysburg as the standard for comparison, although the ration-
ale for this is unclear.
In Seadade Industries, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 6 ' the
162. Id. at 739.
163. Id., quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir.
1944) (L. Hand, J.).
164. 3 E.R.C. 1270 (C.P. Pa. 1971).
165. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
166. 3 E.R.C. at 1275.
167. 245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971).
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question was whether a utility could condemn Seadade's unimproved
marshland for a drainage canal prior to securing approval from federal,
state and local authorities for the project. Seadade argued that probable
damage to the ecology of Biscayne Bay from the thermal discharges would
preclude approval of the project, but the utility argued that the canal was
needed for cooling to avoid that very problem. The court noted that
Florida's constitution declares protection of natural resources to be the
public policy of the state, 68 and held that where condemnation affects
natural resources and where independent authorities guarding the public
interest must approve the project before it can be put into operation,
then the court may require the condemnor to demonstrate the safety to
the public interest.'69 The attempt was to balance protection of the public
interest with the need to complete public projects without undue delay.
Accordingly, the condemnor was required to show that the requirements
for project approval could be met and that taking in advance of approval
would not irreparably damage the natural resources and environment
should the project be disapproved. The court held the utility's proof suf-
ficient.' In a sense, the Florida court did what courts do well: mani-
pulate the burden of proof in a complex situation. But, on the facts of the
case, the court merely protected the condemnee, rather than the environ-
ment; there was no argument that the canal itself would be harmful.
One effect should be to insure that projects are well planned in advance.
But the court is apparently not prepared to rule on the validity of the
regulations themselves under the Florida constitution. If this is correct,
this significantly weakens the constitutional protection because the ulti-
mate decision remains with agencies which may not harken to the voice
of the environmentalist.
People ex rel. MacMullan v. Babcock'7' was a suit to enjoin private
landowners from filling submerged lands adjacent to their property front-
ing on Lake St. Clair. The court held there are no riparian rights with
respect to submerged lands in the Great Lakes area, for such lands are
subject to a public trust imposed by the Michigan constitution.7 2 Under
168. It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural re-
sources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the
abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise.
FLA. CoNsT. art. II, § 7.
169. 245 So. 2d at 214.
170. Id. at 216.
171. 38 Mich. App. 336, 196 N.W2d 489 (1972).
172. The conservation and development of the natural resources of the state
are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the
health, safety and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall provide
for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from
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the trust, the court ruled that such lands may be disposed of only when the
Department of Conservation determines that the lands are of no sub-
stantial public value for hunting, fishing, swimming, boating or naviga-
tion and that the general public interest will not be impaired."' Again,
there is substantial deference to an administrative agency, but it is to an
agency charged with special responsibility for administering the public
trust, rather than to an agency charged with responsibility for some form
of economic development. Moreover, the court is apparently prepared to
require specific findings by the agency as to the impact of any disposition
of the trust, though one might not expect a very thorough review of such
findings once made. This seems a plausible interpretation of the Michigan
constitution Which, after all, favors development as well as conservation
of the natural resources of the state. The court's role seems to be to insure
that the development is planned by public bodies, rather than left to private
initiatives.
CONCLUSION
As developed herein, the only apparent constitutional concern is the
threat to the lives and health of the citizens. This concern may be broad-
ened to encompass the destruction of ecosystem components more re-
motely linked to human survival, through "environmental due process,"
because man's effect on himself is necessarily suffered through his effect
on the balance of all ecosystems of which he is a part. It seems to me that
nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress' paving over the Grand
Canyon if it chooses to do so, absent a demonstration that such a project
would harm the health of the citizens. But government is limited, if only
by the due process amendments, in its power to kill or condemn the health
of its citizens. Killing through environmental degradation is substan-
tively indistinguishable, in constitutional terms, from killing through the
criminal process, though different procedural protections might be af-
forded.
The courts are ill suited to make substantive decisions about environ-
mental quality. They should not decide how good our environment should
be because jobs, economic growth and the relative affluence of the poor
also affect the quality of life-and that life must function outside the
courts. But the courts are perhaps the best suited of our institutions at
perceiving defects in our decision mechanisms. As such, they should in-
pollution, impairment and destruction.
MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 52.
173. People ex rel. MacMullen v. Babcock, 38 Mich. App. 336, -, 196 N.W.2d
489, 497 (1972).
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sure that environmental voices are heard and that the decision making in-
stitutions recognize the significance of the choices they make. Surely the
Constitution, as a document and as a philosophy which allocates the respon-
sibilities for social choices, mandates no less than this if human life is
to be of any constitutional significance.
If environmental degradation is viewed as a problem of balancing
the effects of human activities on the various ecosystems of this "space-
ship earth," then it is clear that every activity by individuals and institu-
tions affects the well-being of us all. It strikes me as absurd to believe
that the Constitution says nothing at all about such a social problem-
that it, alone, is removed from the ecosystems of which every citizen of
the United States is a part. The Constitution does not strike the ecosystem
balance, but it does demand that a balance be struck, and that citizens be
informed and involved in the striking.
